That's a rosy way of looking at it on Dec 3 last year. More recently, from rusi.org, quoted in the article you posted as well as the one I posted above in #29045
Russian forces are likely to peak in late 2024, with increasing material challenges over the course of 2025.
www.rusi.org
Some excerpts:
"The Russian military began 2023 with a highly disorganised force in Ukraine comprising approximately 360,000 troops. By the beginning of the Ukrainian offensive in June 2023, this had risen to 410,000 troops and was becoming more organised. Over the summer of 2023, Russia established training regiments along the border and in the occupied territories and, following the mutiny of Wagner forces, endeavoured to standardise its units, breaking down the previous trend towards private armies. By the beginning of 2024, the Russian Operational Group of Forces in the occupied territories comprised 470,000 troops."
"
The Russian Group of Forces continues to take significant casualties, but is nevertheless growing in size."
"Although the Russian military’s aspiration to increase in size to 1.5 million personnel has not been realised, recruiters are currently achieving almost 85% of their assigned targets for contracting troops to fight in Ukraine. The Kremlin therefore believes that it can sustain the current rate of attrition through 2025."
Unlike Ukraine, no shortage in soldiers.
"
Russian missile production has similarly increased. At the beginning of 2023, for instance, Russian production of Iskandr 9M723 ballistic missiles was six per month, with available missile stocks of 50 munitions. By the beginning of 2024, not only had Russia used a significant number of these missiles each month since the summer of 2023, but it had increased its stockpile to nearly 200 Iskandr 9M723 ballistic and 9M727 cruise missiles. A similar picture can be observed across other core missile types like the Kh-101."
"
Although the injection of around 2 million 122mm rounds from North Korea will help Russia in 2024, it will not compensate for a significant shortfall in available 152mm munitions in 2025."
"
The Russian theory of victory is plausible if Ukraine's international partners fail to properly resource the AFU. However, if Ukraine's partners continue to provide sufficient ammunition and training support to the AFU to enable the blunting of Russian attacks in 2024, then Russia is unlikely to achieve significant gains in 2025. If Russia lacks the prospect of gains in 2025, given its inability to improve force quality for offensive operations, then it follows that it will struggle to force Kyiv to capitulate by 2026. Beyond 2026, attrition of systems will begin to materially degrade Russian combat power, while Russian industry could be disrupted sufficiently by that point, making Russia's prospects decline over time."
I don't know what they mean by 'victory'. If it means keeping part of Ukraine I agree. If it means pushing back Russia entirely... 'r
etired Brigadier General Helmut Ganser told news outlet Zeit Online that "the expectation that Ukraine will be able to restore its full territorial integrity by military means is based on a complete loss of touch with reality, considering the force that would be required and the decreasing willingness of key Western governments to provide support."
I'm supposed to believe Russia's military "lost nearly half the combat effectiveness", is "torn apart", "badly weakened", and Ukraine can achieve victory... but also watch out Europe, ze Ruzzians are coming. I'd probably choke walking and chewing that much gum.