Stealing the Vote: The Kremlin Fixes Another Election
[1]
Vladimir Kara-Murza [2]
Tyrants have never fared well in Russian
elections. The countrys first parliamentary poll in 1906 was decisively won by
the Constitutional Democrats, who ran on a platform of political and social
reforms; pro-czarist parties failed to win a single seat. In the Constituent
Assembly election of 1917, with Lenins Bolsheviks already in control of
government and the armed forces following their October coup, Russians flatly
rejected the emerging dictatorship in favor of the pro-democracy Socialist
Revolutionary Party, by forty to twenty-four percent. In the first-ever direct
election for Russias head of state in 1991, Communist candidate Nikolai
Ryzhkov, backed by the Soviet state apparatus, managed a meager seventeen
percent of the vote to fifty-seven percent for Boris Yeltsin, the face of the
countrys democratic opposition.
Given this history, it is hardly surprising that after ballot-stuffing
his way to victory in the 2000 presidential poll (investigations by the
Moscow Times and the Panorama research center uncovered significant
inflation of his vote in several regions, including Saratov and Dagestan),
Vladimir Putin proceeded to do away with the inconvenience of democracy. The
story of Putins power grab in 20002004 reads surprisingly like Mussolinis in
192225, with the same tactics of plucking the chicken feather by feather used
to weaken resistance. One by one, independent television channels were seized or
shut down; unruly entrepreneurs and sponsors of opposition parties (like Mikhail
Khodorkovsky) were shown their place; the courts were transformed into rubber
stamps for the executive, while elected governors and senators gave way to
Kremlin appointees.
Putins reforms of the electoral laws have largely removed voters from the
business of elections. Russian citizens can no longer run for Parliament as
individuals: the only way to seek office under the 2004 law (signed by Putin,
ironically, on Constitution Day) is by having a place on the nationwide slate of
one of the officially registered political partieswith the registration
process, naturally, being controlled by the government. Since 2006, the number
of registered parties has declined from thirty-five to seven, with the Justice
Ministry also rejecting nine new groups that sought registration. Ideology does
not seem to matter: any partyliberal, conservative, socialist, or
nationalistthat is deemed a potential threat to the Kremlins managed
democracy is denied a license. Pretexts for refusal border on the absurd. In
2007, for instance, People for Democracy and Justice, a center-right party led
by former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, was denied registration on account of
thirty-seven mistakes found in the list of more than fifty-six thousand party
members (some of which were obvious typographic errors, like 1053 instead of
1953 for the year of birth). Responding to a complaint by the similarly
disbanded Republican Party of Russia, the European Court of Human Rights found
the Russian governments stance on party registration to be unjustified and
disproportionate. But this practice continues unabated with the result that
some three-quarters of Russias political groups are currently barred from
taking part in elections.
I n what will no doubt become one of the most
memorable statements from the Putin era, Boris Gryzlov, the speaker of the State
Duma, asserted that Parliament is not a place for discussion. His words are
hard to dispute. After pro-democracy parties were evicted in the heavily
manipulated election of 2003, and the handful of remaining independents booted
out in 2007, the Russian Duma became a parody of parliamentarism, with more than
two-thirds of seats controlled by Putins United Russia party, and the rest
divided among its toothless shadow boxers. The Communists, once a force to be
reckoned with (in 1996, the partys leader, Gennady Zyuganov, came within 3.3
percent of defeating incumbent President Boris Yeltsin in the first round of
voting), have settled into a comfortable niche of loyal opposition, with a
predictable second place in federal and local elections as they continue to talk
about Russias socialist future and Stalin (their warm nostalgia for him
shared by many inside the government), but are no longer a threat to the system.
The same applies to Vladimir Zhirinovskys misnamed Liberal Democrats, who, for
all their nationalist and populist rhetoric, have never challenged the regimes
vested interests. (According to former Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev,
Zhirinovskys party, established in 1989, was given the KGBs blessing to
initiate an alternative to Communist rule and forestall the emergence of a
genuine opposition.) The fourth party in the Duma, the ostensibly center-left
Just Russia, was formed with open Kremlin support: Putins deputy chief of
staff, Vladislav Surkov, called it the second leg of the regime. Russias
formally multiparty system is not dissimilar from that of communist East
Germany, where Putin was once stationed as a KGB officer: the East German
parliament was not, on paper, a one-party legislature, and included
representatives from puppet non-communist parties, such as the Christian
Democratic Union.
Even for the few registered parties, access to the ballot is by no means
unimpeded. In the latest round of regional elections in March, Yablokoa liberal
party with a long history of opposition to the Kremlinhad nearly half of its
candidates disqualified prior to the vote. Pressuring state employees, stuffing
the ballot boxes, bribing voters, rewriting protocols, evicting observers, and
tampering with early and absentee ballots are all common (and well-documented)
tricks used by the authorities to ensure correct results. During the 2007 Duma
campaign, European observers noted reports of harassment of opposition
candidates, detentions, confiscation of election material, threats against
voters, as well as the extensive use of administrative resources . . . on
behalf of United Russia that, in their view, constituted an abuse of power and
a clear violation of international commitments and standards. The results of
that vote were reminiscent of the communist past: the initial tally in the
region of Mordovia, for instance, gave United Russia between one hundred and
four and one hundred and nine percent of the vote (this was later corrected
downward to ninety-three percent); the party claimed eighty-nine percent in
Dagestan, ninety-six percent in Kabardino-Balkaria, and ninety-nine percent in
Chechnya. The maxim attributed to StalinIt is not at all important who and how
will vote . . . It is extremely crucial who and how will count the votesis
alive and well in todays Russia.
Exit polls conducted after the 2009 election to the thirty-five-seat Moscow
Duma predicted a five-party legislature. The official seat-count produced a
thirty-two-to-three split between United Russia and the Communists. In one of
the more notable results of that day, the home precinct of Yabloko chairman
Sergei Mitrokhin, where he had voted with his family, reported zero votes for
his party. Meanwhile, all candidates of the opposition Solidarity movement had
been disqualified because of irregularities in the signatures submitted in
support of their nominations. One Solidarity candidate had his own signature
declared fake. Another was told by the electoral commission that one hundred and
four percent of the signatures he presented were invalid.
Innovations introduced under Putinand preserved by his figurehead
successor, Dmitri Medvedevinclude a ban on electoral coalitions, the abolition
of money deposits, the removal of the against all option, and the elimination
of the minimum turnout requirement. Even if [Putin] alone shows up and votes
for himself, the election will be deemed valid, noted Vladimir Bukovsky, a
prominent Soviet-era dissident who was nominated by the opposition to run for
president in 2008. Bukovskys application was rejected by the Central Electoral
Commission for, among other reasons, failing to produce an official
certificate proving his status as a writerthe books he has published in
several languages not deemed adequate proof of his profession. Vladimir Churov,
the current chairman of the Central Electoral Commission (and Putins old
associate from St. Petersburg), once declared that his first law is that
Putin is always right. Too often, this seems to be the only law that governs
Russian elections.
A s the country heads into a new parliamentary
campaign, with voting scheduled for December 4th, the Kremlins electoral
firewall remains intact. In June, days after President Medvedev assured Western
journalists that he wants the whole of political spectrum to be represented in
our Parliament, the Justice Ministry denied registration to the opposition
Popular Freedom Party, cofounded by former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and
former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov. The partys manifesto included
amnesty for political prisoners, the return of direct gubernatorial elections
and single-member district elections for Parliament, and legislative guarantees
of judicial independence, media freedom, and freedom of assembly, as well as a
package of anticorruption measures. Polls showed that the party was within reach
of parliamentary seatsan unwelcome prospect for the Kremlin. As the 1989
Congress of Peoples Deputiesunder Communist control, but with an outspoken
pro-democracy minoritydemonstrated, even a handful of independent voices in a
monopolized political system can make a difference. Andrei Sakharov, himself a
member of the 1989 Congress, once observed that it is not a case of arithmetic,
but of a qualitative factthe breach of a psychological barrier of silence. The
Popular Freedom Partys application was rejected on the standard pretext:
alleged irregularities in the submitted list of membersin this case, in
seventy-nine out of 46,148. Justice Ministry officials referred to personally
written statements from citizens denying their affiliation with the party. Such
statements did, in fact, exist: for several weeks leading up to the ministrys
announcement, Popular Freedom Party activists across Russia reported receiving
phone calls and visits from police officials pressuring them to sign statements
denouncing their membership. US and EU leaders described the decision to bar the
opposition from the ballot as a breach of Russias international commitments. In
a joint statement, US Senators Benjamin Cardin (a Democrat), Joseph Lieberman
(an Independent), and John McCain (a Republican) pointed out that the
disqualification of the Popular Freedom Party calls into question the
legitimacy and credibility of the upcoming Duma elections. In an apparent
attempt to save face, the Kremlin tasked
Forbes billionaire Mikhail
Prokhorov, who makes no secret of his loyalty to Putin and Medvedev, with
leading a puppet democratic party, Right Cause, into the December election.
Unlike opposition politicians, who are blacklisted by the major media (Vladimir
Pozner, an anchor for televisions Channel One, recently admitted that there
are people who . . . cannot appear on federal television, naming in particular
Boris Nemtsov, Garry Kasparov, and Mikhail Kasyanov), Prokhorov received plenty
of airtime for his proposals of reforms, such as restoring elections for
mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg (but not for the rest of Russias regional
governors). Voters are unlikely to fall for this hoax in Decemberbut it has
been more than a decade since voters decided the outcome of a Russian election.
It is worth noting that Putins refusal to allow the opposition even token
access to the ballot makes his regime less democratic than those of Robert
Mugabe, Alexander Lukashenko, and the late Slobodan Milosevic.
Despite being kept away from television and the ballot itself, Russias
opposition has enjoyed a steady rise in support. In recent years, the
countryliterally, from Kaliningrad to Vladivostokhas been swept by protest
rallies, often centering around local issues, but linked by one common theme:
the demand for accountability. Whether protesting against tax increases, the
destruction of historic architecture, or environmental pollution, Russian
citizens are insisting, first and foremost, on having a say in howand by
whomthey are governed. Polls consistently show that a majority of Russians want
to reinstate direct gubernatorial elections. Promises of order and security
that many voters believedand tacitly agreed to exchange for political
freedomsduring Putins initial rise to power in 1999 and 2000 have been proven
hollow. The much-trumpeted corruption of the 1990s turned out to be childs play
compared to todays levels. In the space of a few years, Putins associatesthe
likes of Arkady Rotenberg and Yuri Kovalchukhave become
Forbes
billionaires. According to polls conducted by the independent Levada Center, in
2007 only sixteen percent of Russians believed that there was more corruption
under Putin than under Yeltsin; by 2011 this figure had reached fifty-two
percent. Transparency International estimates Russias annual corruption market
at $300 billion (nearly a quarter of GDP), placing the country on a par with the
Congo and the Central African Republic in its Corruption Perceptions Index. As
economist Anders Aslund has observed, there is only one state in the world that
is both richer (in terms of GDP per capita) and more corrupt than Putins
Russiaand that is Equatorial Guinea.
The 2009 economic meltdown (the countrys GDP fell by 7.9 percent, with the
official unemployment figure surpassing eight percent) brought an end to
illusions that Russia was somehow shielded from outside events, even during
periods of relatively high oil prices. Despite Putins pledge to wipe out
terrorists in the shithouse, his promises to pacify the North Caucasus, and
an eleven-fold increase in law enforcement budget (from $2.8 billion to $31.3
billion) between 2000 and 2009, security problems have worsened, with terrorists
staging high-profile attacks in Moscow, and insurgency spreading through all of
Russias Muslim regions. On Putins watch, the number of terrorist incidents has
risen from 135 in 2000 to 786 in 2009, increasing by fifty percent in 2009
alone. Adding to all this is the natural fatigue with a regime that has entered
its thirteenth year in power. A poll conducted this summer by the Levada Center
showed that fifty-two percent of Russians disapprove of the current government.
Another poll, by the Public Opinion Foundation, indicated that forty-nine
percent are ready to personally take part in protest rallies.
The regime has responded to this threat with a combination of carrot and
stick, offering concessions in some instances (firing the unpopular Kaliningrad
governor, Georgy Boos, whose resignation was demanded by thousands of street
protesters), and crackdowns in others. Peaceful pro-democracy rallies across
Russia on the last day of each month that has thirty-one days (symbolizing
Article 31 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of assembly) are
routinely dispersed by police, often with inexplicable brutality. After one such
rally in Moscow, on New Years Eve, opposition leaders, including Boris Nemtsov,
were arrested and jailed for disobedience.
The regimes declining support is seen even in the results of its own
stage-managed elections. In the March 13th regional pollwidely considered a
dress rehearsal for the parliamentary electionUnited Russia lost votes all
around the country. In seven of the twelve regions that voted on that day,
Putins party failed to reach even the fifty percent mark, falling to 36.7
percent in Kirov and 39.8 percent in Tver. In eleven of the twelve regions,
United Russias result fell in comparison with the 2007 Duma election, including
a drop of twenty-two percentage points in Khanty-Mansiysk, twenty in Tver,
nineteen in Kirov and Orenburg, and eighteen in Nizhny Novgorod. Unable to vote
for real opposition parties, many Russians have turned to their paper
substitutes as a means to protest. Just Russia has been scoring in double digits
and appeared headed for a win in Decembers election to the St. Petersburg
legislature until the Kremlin, acting to prevent embarrassment, reprimanded its
second leg by removing Just Russia leader Sergei Mironov from his post as
speaker of the upper house of Parliament, thus shutting off the partys
administrative lifeline. Conscious of its falling ratings, United Russia has
attempted a relaunch: Vladimir Putin announced that his party will contest the
December election as part of a new Popular Front consisting of some five
hundred organizations, from the Union of Women to the Union of Transport
Workers. Witty commentators have compared this formation to Stalins
Unbreakable Bloc of Communists and Non-Party People created before the Soviet
elections of 1937. Reinforcing the analogy, Putins Front has drafted its
manifesto in the form of a five-year plan.
Even with weakened public support, the Putin-Medvedev tandem is still
capable of ensuring the correct vote tally in December, as well as in the
presidential election next March. The Kremlins rich arsenal of administrative
tricks may be reinforced by coercion: Vladislav Surkov, previously Putins
deputy chief of staff, now Medvedevs, has urged members of the pro-government
Nashi (Ours) youth groupwhich he described as the combat detachment of our
political systemto train their muscles ahead of elections. There is little
doubt that the vote on December 4th will produce another puppet legislature,
with Putins Popular Front as the dominant force, the parties of Gennady
Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky as the loyal opposition, and perhaps a
sprinkling of Right Cause deputies as a democratic facade for the West. But,
as Hosni Mubaraks convincing win in the 2010 Egyptian electionhis National
Democratic Party swept the board with more than eighty percent of parliamentary
seatshas demonstrated, choreographed votes do not necessarily translate into
political stability. In fact, they often do the opposite. In May, while the
Popular Freedom Partys registration bid was still pending, a group of prominent
cultural figures, including writer Vladimir Voinovich and film director Eldar
Ryazanov, published a letter warning the authorities that, unless the system is
liberalized from above, it will be inevitablyand maybe violentlybrought down
from below. The attempt to conserve the current non-constitutional order can
lead to serious socio-political upheavals in the nearest future, the letter
cautioned, placing responsibility for the consequences on Putin and Medvedev.
The Kremlin has so far not heeded the call. One more lesson from Russias
history is that despotic regimes here rarely exit on their own
terms.
