One of the Cult of Sanders axioms is the "Democratic Party's Business Model" completely explains Democratic losses over the past 15 years. The problem with calling it a "model" as it's explained by @Padawanbater2 and used by but not understood by @ttystikk is that it's not a model at all and isn't useful to predict outcomes.
The following is a non-cultist model that uses demographic shifts that explains past results much better and the rather loosely defined and model that The Cult of Sanders Uses. I post this here as a counter-example of the one proposed by Bernie Sanders and to show that there are better ways to predict results than simple belief in the manner that The Cult of Sanders uses.
https://www.americanprogress.org/is...018/04/14/449461/americas-electoral-future-2/
The recent elections of Donald Trump and Barack Obama were influenced in no small measure by shifts in the nation’s underlying demographic structure—the rise of communities of color, the increase in the number of older Americans, the sharpening of education divisions—and the distinctive voting behavior of these demographic groups. This 2018 report of the States of Change project, the fourth in an annual series,1 examines an array of future presidential election outcome scenarios—from 2020 through 2036—that could arise as the demography of the nation and its 50 states changes over the next 18 years.
These scenarios, developed by the authors, include outcomes that favor both Republican and Democratic candidates. They are not intended as predictions but are simulations based on assumptions about different demographic groups’ future voting patterns. Each of the alternative scenarios assumes the same projections for the nation’s underlying demographic structure of eligible voters (EVs) with respect to race, age, and education attainment. As such, the scenarios provide for a more in-depth understanding than national or state polling trends can supply about how emerging voting patterns may interact with changes in the demography of the nation’s electorate to affect future popular vote and Electoral College outcomes.
Note that this is based upon fundamental facts such as predictable shifts in demographics away from conservative white majority to a more diverse society by 2036. What cannot be predicted is how attitudes will shift over time. The authors deal with this by running simulations using various possible shifts in attitudes within demographic groups. For example, a shift towards Republican values by Hispanic demographic would yield a different result than if the Hispanic group remains in the more liberal and Democratic Party's camp.
A conclusion from multiple runs using this model based upon known future shifts in demographics as an underlying explanation for election results:
that outcomes like the one in 2016 are more likely to occur over the next decade than not. Later on, the country will move into a more stable and liberal era of governance.