Police Break The Law, Marijuana in Texas

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/part-VI/chapter-153

28 U.S. Code § 2254 - State custody; remedies in Federal courts
(a)
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b)
(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—
(A)
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B)
(i)
there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii)
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
(2)
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.
(3)
A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.
(c)
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
(e)
(1)
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i)
a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii)
a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B)
the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
(f)
If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in such State court proceeding to support the State court’s determination of a factual issue made therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such determination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is unable to produce such part of the record, then the State shall produce such part of the record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so by order directed to an appropriate State official. If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of the record, then the court shall determine under the existing facts and circumstances what weight shall be given to the State court’s factual determination.
(g)
A copy of the official records of the State court, duly certified by the clerk of such court to be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable written indicia showing such a factual determination by the State court shall be admissible in the Federal court proceeding.
(h)
Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, in all proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel for an applicant who is or becomes financially unable to afford counsel, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Appointment of counsel under this section shall be governed by section 3006A of title 18.
(i)
The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967; Pub. L. 89–711, § 2, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1105; Pub. L. 104–132, title I, § 104, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1218.)


28 U.S. Code § 2243 - Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision
A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.

When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained.

The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 965.)

Rule 5.1. Constitutional Challenge to a Statute
(a) Notice by a Party. A party that files a pleading, written motion, or other paper drawing into question the constitutionality of a federal or state statute must promptly:

(1) file a notice of constitutional question stating the question and identifying the paper that raises it, if:

(A) a federal statute is questioned and the parties do not include the United States, one of its agencies, or one of its officers or employees in an official capacity; or

(B) a state statute is questioned and the parties do not include the state, one of its agencies, or one of its officers or employees in an official capacity; and

(2) serve the notice and paper on the Attorney General of the United States if a federal statute is questioned—or on the state attorney general if a state statute is questioned—either by certified or registered mail or by sending it to an electronic address designated by the attorney general for this purpose.

28 U.S.C. §2403, certify to the appropriate attorney general that a statute has been questioned.

(c) Intervention; Final Decision on the Merits. Unless the court sets a later time, the attorney general may intervene within 60 days after the notice is filed or after the court certifies the challenge, whichever is earlier. Before the time to intervene expires, the court may reject the constitutional challenge, but may not enter a final judgment holding the statute unconstitutional.

(d) No Forfeiture. A party's failure to file and serve the notice, or the court's failure to certify, does not forfeit a constitutional claim or defense that is otherwise timely asserted.

42 U.S. Code § 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.


42 U.S. Code § 1982 - Property rights of citizens
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.


42 U.S. Code § 1981 - Equal rights under the law
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined
For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

Bounds v. Smith430 U.S. 817 (1977)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/430/817/case.html

42 U.S. Code § 1988 - Proceedings in vindication of civil rights
(a) Applicability of statutory and common law
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.

1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92–318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.

(c) Expert fees
In awarding an attorney’s fee under subsection (b) of this section in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.

http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-federalist-papers/
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-federalist-papers/the-federalist-10.php
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-federalist-papers/the-federalist-51.php

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Free Exercise Clause (US Constitution, 1st Amendment)
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."

Freedom of Worship Clause (Texas Constitution, Article 1 Section 6)
Sec. 6. FREEDOM OF WORSHIP.
"All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship."

18 U.S. Code § 247 - Damage to religious property; obstruction of persons in the free exercise of religious beliefs
(a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances referred to in subsection (b) of this section—
(1)
intentionally defaces, damages, or destroys any religious real property, because of the religious character of that property, or attempts to do so; or
(2)
intentionally obstructs, by force or threat of force, any person in the enjoyment of that person’s free exercise of religious beliefs, or attempts to do so;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (d).
(b)
The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the offense is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.
(c)
Whoever intentionally defaces, damages, or destroys any religious real property because of the race, color, or ethnic characteristics of any individual associated with that religious property, or attempts to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (d).
(d) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) of this section shall be—
(1)
if death results from acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, a fine in accordance with this title and imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death;
(2)
if bodily injury results to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this section, and the violation is by means of fire or an explosive, a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more that 40 years, or both;
(3)
if bodily injury to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this section, results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, a fine in accordance with this title and imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both; and
(4)
in any other case, a fine in accordance with this title and imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
(e)
No prosecution of any offense described in this section shall be undertaken by the United States except upon the certification in writing of the Attorney General or his designee that in his judgment a prosecution by the United States is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice.
(f)
As used in this section, the term “religious real property” means any church, synagogue, mosque, religious cemetery, or other religious real property, including fixtures or religious objects contained within a place of religious worship.
(g)
No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any noncapital offense under this section unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted not later than 7 years after the date on which the offense was committed.

The Corruption case against Collin County Texas

18 U.S. Code Chapter 96 - RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-96

• § 1961 - Definitions
• § 1962 - Prohibited activities
• § 1963 - Criminal penalties
• § 1964 - Civil remedies
• § 1965 - Venue and process
• § 1966 - Expedition of actions
• § 1967 - Evidence
• § 1968 - Civil investigative demand

Corruption in Collin County/Texas Government
http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2015/09/ken-paxton-hires-terri-moore-dan-cogdell-to-lead-defense-team.html/
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/public_corruption
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/docs/PE/htm/PE.39.htm

Rick Perry
Kirk Watson
Mary Ann Wiley
David L Botsford

Ken Paxton
Eldorado-Collin L.P.
Cornerstone Development
Chicago Title Insurance Co.
Collin County Appraisal District
Unity Resources LLC
WatchGuard Video
Enforcement Video LP
Greg Willis
Don Day
Byron Cook
Anthony Holm
Dan Cogdell
Terri Moore
Ted Cruz
Dan Patrick
Howard Hamilton
Judge Willis
Servergy Inc.
William Mapp
Joel Hochberg

Jason Gray
Jason Cooley
Ty Lake
Joe Williams
Todd Philips
Cheree Bontrager
Geralyn Kever

John Roach
Judge Sandoval
Judge Roach Jr.
Patricia Wysong Crigger
Hannah Kunkle
Rebecca Littrell
Sherry Bell

Kerrie Walker
Curtis Howard

Dwayne Henderson

Rick Perry threatened to, and did because if personal disputes with other officials, use his office to veto otherwise passable bills and coerced an official into resignation.

Ken Paxton & Byron Cook voted for spending bills that gave state business WatchGuard video which they own stock in. Byron Cook is on the board of WatchGuard and Ken Paxton helped form the company and loaned it money. WatchGuard was contracted to provide cameras to McKinney Police.

El Dorado-Collin, a company Ken Paxton and Greg Willis are partners in, bought land from North Dallas Loan and Trust, then lobbied to rezone it. Days after rezoning it sold the land to Cornerstone development who used a company Ken Paxton has interest in called Chicago Title Insurance Co., cornerstone then sold the land to Mckinney's appraisal district, who Paxton was aware the whole time wanted to buy the land.

1 Grand Jury in Collin county has:
5 members from one church, the pastor is the Foreman, 2 associate pastors are jurors and 2 more church members are on the same jury. One juror hosted a fund raiser for Greg Willis in her home and donated to Ken Paxton's campaign, one supported Greg Willis' campaign. 2 have served on the executive committee of the Collin county Republican Party.

2nd Grand Jury in Collin county:
The foreman and vice foreman were actively involved in Ken Paxton's campaign.

http://www.leagle.com/decision/19801200446US754_11169/HANRAHAN v. HAMPTON

Liability for Officers who Search with invalid warrants or no warrants

Messerschmidt, et al. v. Millender, et al. 565 U.S. ___ (2012)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/565/10-704/

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015)
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
"The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 –486. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed."

Ex Parte Young 209 U.S. 123 (190
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/209/123/case.html

Color of Law
The act of a state officer, regardless of whether or not the act is within the limits of his or her authority, is considered an act under color of law if the officer purports to be conducting himself or herself in the course of official duties. Under the civil rights act of 1871 (42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983), color of law is synonymous with State Action, which is conduct by an officer that bears a sufficiently close nexus to a state so that the action is treated as though it is by the state.
18 U.S. Code § 242 - Deprivation of rights under color of law
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

The Blue Wall of Silence:
This code is considered to be police corruption and misconduct. Any officers who engage in discriminatory arrests, physical or verbal harassment, and selective enforcement of the law are considered to be corrupt. Federal laws strongly prohibit this.

Examples:
Knapp Commission
Mollen Commission
Rodney King
Fred Hampton and Edward Hanrahan

Types of Police misconduct include false confession, false arrest, false evidence, false imprisonment, intimidation, police brutality, police corruption, racial profiling, surveillance abuse, witness tampering, and off-duty misconduct.

Others include:
1. Noble Cause corruption, where an officer believes that a good outcome justifies his bad behavior.
2. Selective Enforcement, allowing friends, family and other officers to break the law.
3. Abuse of Power, using the badge to get in to places you would otherwise not be invited or allowed, discounts, etc.
4. Police Perjury, blatant lying under oath and/or to other authorities to cover wrongdoing.
5. Violation by Officers of police procedural policy.

Laws intended to protect against abuse of authority include the 4th Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures; the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, which includes due process and equal protection clauses; the Civil Rights Act of 1871; and the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Noble Cause corruption:
Corruption caused by the adherence to a teleological ethical system (ex: By their fruits you shall know them; pulling over anyone with larger rims on their car), suggesting that the person "will utilize unethical, and sometimes illegal, means to obtain a desired result," a result which appears to benefit the greater good.

Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) in Title 18
"Although none of these statutes was enacted in order to prosecute official corruption, each has been interpreted to provide the means to do so"

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. ___ (2015)
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-719_8mjp.pdf
28 U.S. Code § 1332 - Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs
(d)
(1) In this subsection—
(A)
the term “class” means all of the class members in a class action;
(B)
the term “class action” means any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action;
(C)
the term “class certification order” means an order issued by a court approving the treatment of some or all aspects of a civil action as a class action; and
(D)
the term “class members” means the persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the definition of the proposed or certified class in a class action.
(2) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which—
(A)
any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant;
(B)
any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(C)
any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
(3) A district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph (2) over a class action in which greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed based on consideration of—
(A)
whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest;
(B)
whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of other States;
(C)
whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction;
(D)
whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants;
(E)
whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of States; and
(F)
whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.
(4) A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph (2)—
(A)
(i) over a class action in which—
(I)
greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed;
(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant—
(aa)
from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class;
(bb)
whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and
(cc)
who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed; and
(III)
principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was originally filed; and
(ii)
during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons; or
(B)
two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.
(5) Paragraphs (2) through (4) shall not apply to any class action in which—
(A)
the primary defendants are States, State officials, or other governmental entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief; or
(B)
the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is less than 100.
(6)
In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
(7)
Citizenship of the members of the proposed plaintiff classes shall be determined for purposes of paragraphs (2) through (6) as of the date of filing of the complaint or amended complaint, or, if the case stated by the initial pleading is not subject to Federal jurisdiction, as of the date of service by plaintiffs of an amended pleading, motion, or other paper, indicating the existence of Federal jurisdiction.
(
This subsection shall apply to any class action before or after the entry of a class certification order by the court with respect to that action.
[1] of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 78p(f)(3) [2]) and section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(5)(E));
(B)
that relates to the internal affairs or governance of a corporation or other form of business enterprise and that arises under or by virtue of the laws of the State in which such corporation or business enterprise is incorporated or organized; or
(C)
that relates to the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to any security (as defined under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1)) and the regulations issued thereunder).
(10)
For purposes of this subsection and section 1453, an unincorporated association shall be deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is organized.
(11)
(A)
For purposes of this subsection and section 1453, a mass action shall be deemed to be a class action removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise meets the provisions of those paragraphs.
(B)
(i)
As used in subparagraph (A), the term “mass action” means any civil action (except a civil action within the scope of section 1711(2)) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection (a).
(ii) As used in subparagraph (A), the term “mass action” shall not include any civil action in which—
(I)
all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that State;
(II)
the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant;
(III)
all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such action; or
(IV)
the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.
(C)
(i)
Any action(s) removed to Federal court pursuant to this subsection shall not thereafter be transferred to any other court pursuant to section 1407, or the rules promulgated thereunder, unless a majority of the plaintiffs in the action request transfer pursuant to section 1407.
(ii) This subparagraph will not apply—
(I)
to cases certified pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; or
(II)
if plaintiffs propose that the action proceed as a class action pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(D)
The limitations periods on any claims asserted in a mass action that is removed to Federal court pursuant to this subsection shall be deemed tolled during the period that the action is pending in Federal court.
(e)
The word “States”, as used in this section, includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Watson v. Jones80 U.S. 679 (1871)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/80/679/case.html

1) Courts can not rule on the truth or falsity of a religious teaching;
2) Where a previous authority structure existed before the dispute, courts should defer to the decisions of that structure, and;
3) In the absence of such an internal authority structure, courts should defer to the wishes of a majority of the congregation.

Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich 426 U.S. 696 (1976)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/426/696/

"Per the Establishment Clause, decisions imposed by hierarchical religious organizations are binding in civil courts"

Civil Rights Act of 1866
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Rights_Act_of_1866

Civil Rights Act of 1871
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Enforcement_Act_of_1871

Civil Rights Act of 1957
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Rights_Act_of_1957

Civil Rights Act of 1964
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Rights_Act_of_1964

Civil Rights Act of 1965
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_Rights_Act_of_1965

Thomas Jefferson

http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0222-0002



Resolved, That the statutes 1.E.6.c.1. 5 & 6.E.6.c.1. 1.El.c.2. 23.El.c.1. 28.El.c.6. 35.El.c.1. 1.Jac.1.c.4. 3.Jac.1.c.1. 3.Jac.1.c.4. 3.Jac.1.c.21. and the act of ass. 1705.c.6. & so much of all other acts or <ordinances> statutes as <prescribe punishments for the offence of opinions deemed heretical> render criminal the maintaining any opinions in matters of religion or the exercising any mode of worship whatever or as prescribe punishments for the same <; and all acts or statutes> <acts or ordinances made against> ought to be repealed.

Resolved that it is the opn of this Commee that so much of the sd. petitions as prays that the establishment of the Church of England by law in this Commonwealth may be discontinued, and that no pre-eminence may be allowed to any one Religious sect over another, is reasonable; & therefore that the several laws establishing the sd. Church of England, giving peculiar privileges to <the> it’s ministers <thereof>, & levying for the support thereof <the same> contributions on the people independent of their good will ought to be repealed; saving to such incumbents as are now actually seised of Glebe lands, their rights to such Glebe lands during their lives, & to such parishes as have received private donations for the <use of> support of the sd. Church <of England> the perpetual benefit of such donations.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters268 U.S. 510 (1925)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/268/510/case.html

Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church210 U.S. 296 (190
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/210/296/case.html

Treaty of Paris 1763
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Paris_(1763)

Bolling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/347/497/case.html
But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and therefore we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.