BudmanTX
Well-Known Member
wrong again:
Hungary is a member of the European Union and NATO
you really need to up your game here, seriously
so i ask again....what countries??
War
- Thread starter captainmorgan
- Start date
Hungary is a member of the European Union and NATO
you really need to up your game here, seriously
so i ask again....what countries??
Crumpetlicker
Well-Known Member
Fair enough and what is wrong with that. Workers get screwed by the capitalist system and deserve to be made shareholders in the firms they work for. The workers of the world will one day rest back control of the means of supply my comrade.
Fogdog
Well-Known Member
I read things on extremely biased and unreliable sites to find out what the propaganda paper hangers are saying. That said, I made it through the first question and felt no need to see what Chomsky said.
"What if Mexico joined an alliance with Russia, how do you think the US would react? "
mediabiasfactcheck.com
"What if Mexico joined an alliance with Russia, how do you think the US would react? "
- Overall, we rate Truthout strongly Left Biased based on story selection and political positions that favor the left. We also rate them Mixed for factual reporting due to publishing a false story and promoting anti-GMO propaganda.
TruthOut - Bias and Credibility
LEFT BIAS These media sources are moderate to strongly biased toward liberal causes through story selection and/or political affiliation. They may
mediabiasfactcheck.com
Crumpetlicker
Well-Known Member
Comrade they are a member of NATO though and they objected to the Ukraine being made members. Do some reading!
hanimmal
Well-Known Member
Well it would have to be up to the to want to join. Shit we can't even make people get a vaccine to save their lives, how would we make a nation decide to join NATO?
More lies Putin has trolled into existence.
Yeah it has hurt us average Americans so much.
Crumpetlicker
Well-Known Member
Your a tool though. If you read on, Chomsky said there was no need to answer that question as we all know what would happen. The US would go to war with Mexico in a heartbeat.I read things on extremely biased and unreliable sites to find out what the propaganda paper hangers are saying. That said, I made it through the first question and felt no need to see what Chomsky said.
"What if Mexico joined an alliance with Russia, how do you think the US would react? "
- Overall, we rate Truthout strongly Left Biased based on story selection and political positions that favor the left. We also rate them Mixed for factual reporting due to publishing a false story and promoting anti-GMO propaganda.
View attachment 5091603
View attachment 5091602
TruthOut - Bias and Credibility
LEFT BIAS These media sources are moderate to strongly biased toward liberal causes through story selection and/or political affiliation. They may
printer
Well-Known Member
Russia's demands.
general characteristics
We state that the American side did not give a constructive response to the basic elements of the draft treaty with the United States prepared by the Russian side on security guarantees. We are talking about the rejection of further expansion of NATO, the withdrawal of the "Bucharest formula" that "Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO", and the rejection of the creation of military bases on the territory of states that were previously part of the USSR and are not members of the alliance, including the use of their infrastructure for conducting any military activity, as well as the return of military capabilities, including strike, and NATO infrastructure to the state of 1997, when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed. These provisions are of fundamental importance for the Russian Federation.
The package nature of Russian proposals was ignored, from which "convenient" topics were deliberately chosen, which, in turn, were "twisted" in the direction of creating advantages for the US and its allies. This approach, as well as the accompanying rhetoric from US officials, reinforces legitimate doubts that Washington is truly committed to fixing the European security situation.
The growing US and NATO military activity close to Russian borders is alarming, while our "red lines" and core security interests, as well as Russia's sovereign right to protect them, continue to be ignored. Ultimate demands to withdraw troops from certain areas on Russian territory, accompanied by threats of tougher sanctions, are unacceptable and undermine the prospects for reaching real agreements.
In the absence of the readiness of the American side to agree on firm, legally binding guarantees to ensure our security from the United States and its allies, Russia will be forced to respond, including through the implementation of military-technical measures.
In Ukraine
There is no and is not planned any "Russian invasion" of Ukraine, which the United States and its allies have been declaring at the official level since autumn last year, therefore statements about Russia's "responsibility for the escalation" cannot be regarded otherwise than as an attempt to put pressure on and devalue Russia's proposals for security guarantees.
The mention in this context of Russian obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum has nothing to do with the intra-Ukrainian conflict and does not apply to circumstances resulting from the action of internal factors there. The loss of territorial integrity by the Ukrainian state is the result of the processes that have taken place within it.
(In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States, Russia, and Britain committed “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force” against the country. Those assurances played a key role in persuading the Ukrainian government in Kyiv to give up what amounted to the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, consisting of some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads.)
The accusations of Russia contained in the American response that it "occupied Crimea" also do not stand up to scrutiny. In 2014, a coup d'etat took place in Kiev, the initiators of which, with the support of the United States and its allies, headed for the creation of a nationalist state that infringes on the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, as well as other "non-titular" ethnic groups. It is not surprising that in such a situation, the Crimeans voted for reunification with Russia. The decision of the people of Crimea and Sevastopol to return to the Russian Federation was made by free will in the exercise of the right to self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter. No force or threat of force was used. The question of Crimea's belonging is closed.
(Uh, no.)
If Ukraine is accepted into NATO, there will be a real threat that the regime in Kiev will try to “return” Crimea by force, drawing in the United States and its allies, in accordance with Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, into a direct armed conflict with Russia with all the ensuing consequences.
The thesis repeated in the US response that Russia allegedly "ignited the conflict in Donbass" is untenable. Its reasons are purely domestic in nature. The settlement is possible only through the implementation of the Minsk agreements and a set of measures, the sequence and responsibility for the implementation of which are clearly defined and unanimously confirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2202, including by the United States, France and Great Britain. In paragraph 2 of this resolution, Kiev, Donetsk and Lugansk are named as parties. None of these documents mentions Russia's responsibility for the conflict in Donbas. Russia, together with the OSCE, plays the role of a mediator in the main negotiating format - the contact group - and together with Berlin and Paris - in the Normandy format, which formulates recommendations to the parties to the conflict and monitors their implementation.
To de-escalate the situation around Ukraine, it is fundamentally important to take the following steps. These are forcing Kiev to comply with a set of measures, stopping the supply of weapons to Ukraine, withdrawing all Western advisers and instructors from there, refusing NATO countries from any joint exercises with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and withdrawing all foreign weapons previously delivered to Kiev outside Ukrainian territory.
In this regard, we draw attention to the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a press conference following the talks in Moscow with French President Emmanuel Macron on February 7, 2022, stressed that we are open to dialogue and call for "thinking about stable security conditions for all, equal for all participants in international life.
Force configuration
We note that in its response to the Russian proposals, the United States insists that progress in improving the European security situation "can only be achieved in terms of de-escalation in relation to Russia's threatening actions against Ukraine", which, as we understand, implies the requirement withdrawal of Russian troops from the borders of Ukraine. At the same time, the United States is ready to talk only about "mutual obligations ... to refrain from deploying permanently based forces with combat missions on the territory of Ukraine" and "to consider the possibility of discussing the problem of conventional armed forces." As for the rest, the American side passes over in silence our proposals contained in sec. 2 tbsp. 4 and par. 1 st. 5 of the draft bilateral treaty and declares that "
We presume that the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on its territory does not and cannot affect the fundamental interests of the United States. We would like to remind you that there are no our forces on the territory of Ukraine.
At the same time, the United States and its allies were moving their military infrastructure to the east, deploying contingents in the territories of new members. They bypassed the CFE restrictions and rather loosely interpreted the provisions of the Russia-NATO Founding Act on the renunciation of "additional permanent deployment of substantial combat forces." The situation that has developed as a result of these actions is unacceptable. We insist on the withdrawal of all US armed forces and weapons deployed in CEE, SEE and the Baltics. We are convinced that the national potentials in these zones are quite sufficient. We are ready to discuss this topic on the basis of Art. 4 and 5 of the Russian draft treaty.
general characteristics
We state that the American side did not give a constructive response to the basic elements of the draft treaty with the United States prepared by the Russian side on security guarantees. We are talking about the rejection of further expansion of NATO, the withdrawal of the "Bucharest formula" that "Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO", and the rejection of the creation of military bases on the territory of states that were previously part of the USSR and are not members of the alliance, including the use of their infrastructure for conducting any military activity, as well as the return of military capabilities, including strike, and NATO infrastructure to the state of 1997, when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed. These provisions are of fundamental importance for the Russian Federation.
The package nature of Russian proposals was ignored, from which "convenient" topics were deliberately chosen, which, in turn, were "twisted" in the direction of creating advantages for the US and its allies. This approach, as well as the accompanying rhetoric from US officials, reinforces legitimate doubts that Washington is truly committed to fixing the European security situation.
The growing US and NATO military activity close to Russian borders is alarming, while our "red lines" and core security interests, as well as Russia's sovereign right to protect them, continue to be ignored. Ultimate demands to withdraw troops from certain areas on Russian territory, accompanied by threats of tougher sanctions, are unacceptable and undermine the prospects for reaching real agreements.
In the absence of the readiness of the American side to agree on firm, legally binding guarantees to ensure our security from the United States and its allies, Russia will be forced to respond, including through the implementation of military-technical measures.
In Ukraine
There is no and is not planned any "Russian invasion" of Ukraine, which the United States and its allies have been declaring at the official level since autumn last year, therefore statements about Russia's "responsibility for the escalation" cannot be regarded otherwise than as an attempt to put pressure on and devalue Russia's proposals for security guarantees.
The mention in this context of Russian obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum has nothing to do with the intra-Ukrainian conflict and does not apply to circumstances resulting from the action of internal factors there. The loss of territorial integrity by the Ukrainian state is the result of the processes that have taken place within it.
(In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States, Russia, and Britain committed “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force” against the country. Those assurances played a key role in persuading the Ukrainian government in Kyiv to give up what amounted to the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, consisting of some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads.)
The accusations of Russia contained in the American response that it "occupied Crimea" also do not stand up to scrutiny. In 2014, a coup d'etat took place in Kiev, the initiators of which, with the support of the United States and its allies, headed for the creation of a nationalist state that infringes on the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, as well as other "non-titular" ethnic groups. It is not surprising that in such a situation, the Crimeans voted for reunification with Russia. The decision of the people of Crimea and Sevastopol to return to the Russian Federation was made by free will in the exercise of the right to self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter. No force or threat of force was used. The question of Crimea's belonging is closed.
(Uh, no.)
If Ukraine is accepted into NATO, there will be a real threat that the regime in Kiev will try to “return” Crimea by force, drawing in the United States and its allies, in accordance with Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, into a direct armed conflict with Russia with all the ensuing consequences.
The thesis repeated in the US response that Russia allegedly "ignited the conflict in Donbass" is untenable. Its reasons are purely domestic in nature. The settlement is possible only through the implementation of the Minsk agreements and a set of measures, the sequence and responsibility for the implementation of which are clearly defined and unanimously confirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2202, including by the United States, France and Great Britain. In paragraph 2 of this resolution, Kiev, Donetsk and Lugansk are named as parties. None of these documents mentions Russia's responsibility for the conflict in Donbas. Russia, together with the OSCE, plays the role of a mediator in the main negotiating format - the contact group - and together with Berlin and Paris - in the Normandy format, which formulates recommendations to the parties to the conflict and monitors their implementation.
To de-escalate the situation around Ukraine, it is fundamentally important to take the following steps. These are forcing Kiev to comply with a set of measures, stopping the supply of weapons to Ukraine, withdrawing all Western advisers and instructors from there, refusing NATO countries from any joint exercises with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and withdrawing all foreign weapons previously delivered to Kiev outside Ukrainian territory.
In this regard, we draw attention to the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a press conference following the talks in Moscow with French President Emmanuel Macron on February 7, 2022, stressed that we are open to dialogue and call for "thinking about stable security conditions for all, equal for all participants in international life.
Force configuration
We note that in its response to the Russian proposals, the United States insists that progress in improving the European security situation "can only be achieved in terms of de-escalation in relation to Russia's threatening actions against Ukraine", which, as we understand, implies the requirement withdrawal of Russian troops from the borders of Ukraine. At the same time, the United States is ready to talk only about "mutual obligations ... to refrain from deploying permanently based forces with combat missions on the territory of Ukraine" and "to consider the possibility of discussing the problem of conventional armed forces." As for the rest, the American side passes over in silence our proposals contained in sec. 2 tbsp. 4 and par. 1 st. 5 of the draft bilateral treaty and declares that "
We presume that the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on its territory does not and cannot affect the fundamental interests of the United States. We would like to remind you that there are no our forces on the territory of Ukraine.
At the same time, the United States and its allies were moving their military infrastructure to the east, deploying contingents in the territories of new members. They bypassed the CFE restrictions and rather loosely interpreted the provisions of the Russia-NATO Founding Act on the renunciation of "additional permanent deployment of substantial combat forces." The situation that has developed as a result of these actions is unacceptable. We insist on the withdrawal of all US armed forces and weapons deployed in CEE, SEE and the Baltics. We are convinced that the national potentials in these zones are quite sufficient. We are ready to discuss this topic on the basis of Art. 4 and 5 of the Russian draft treaty.
BudmanTX
Well-Known Member
nothing wrong with it, especially if it's literature purposes, and not a bible to follow
and that quote there is right in line with communism
printer
Well-Known Member
The principle of the indivisibility of security
We did not see in the US response confirmation that the American side is fully committed to observing the immutable principle of the indivisibility of security. General statements about the consideration by the American side of this postulate directly contradict Washington's unwillingness to abandon its counterproductive and destabilizing course of creating advantages for itself and its allies at the expense of Russia's security interests. This is exactly what is happening as a result of the unrestrained implementation by the North Atlantic Alliance, with the leading role of the United States, of a policy of unrestricted geostrategic and military development of the post-Soviet space, including the territory of Ukraine, which is of a particularly sensitive nature for us. All this is happening directly on Russian borders. Thus, our "red lines" and fundamental security interests are ignored and Russia's inalienable right to provide for them is denied. For us, this is, of course, unacceptable.
Additionally, we remind you that this principle is enshrined in the preamble to the 2011 Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms, which the parties agreed to extend for five years without any exceptions in February last year, as well as in a number of high-level OSCE and Russia-NATO basic documents adopted: in the preamble of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe, the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act, the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Charter for European Security, the Rome Declaration Russia-NATO 2002 and the Astana Declaration of the 2010 OSCE Summit.
We note that the response received mentions Washington's adherence to the concept of the indivisibility of security. But in the text it boils down to the right of states "to freely choose or change the methods of ensuring their security, including union treaties." This freedom is not absolute and is only half of the well-known formula fixed in the Charter for European Security. Its second part requires, when exercising this right, not "... to strengthen one's security at the expense of the security of other states." We cannot regard the letter received from NATO dated February 10, 2022 as a response to the message sent by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on January 28, 2022 to US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on this issue. We asked for a response in a national capacity.
NATO Open Door Policy
The US reaffirms "strong support" for NATO's "open door" policy. But it contradicts the basic commitments adopted within the framework of the CSCE/OSCE, above all the commitment "not to strengthen one's security at the expense of the security of others." This policy is not consistent with the guidelines of the alliance itself, which, following the meeting of the NATO Foreign Minister on June 6-7, 1991 in Copenhagen, undertook "not to take unilateral advantages from the changed situation in Europe", "not to threaten the legitimate interests" of other states, not to strive for them " isolation" or "drawing new dividing lines on the continent".
We call on the United States and NATO to return to fulfilling their international obligations in the field of maintaining peace and security. We expect concrete proposals from the members of the alliance on the content and forms of legal consolidation of the renunciation of NATO's further eastward expansion.
Batch nature of offers
We note the readiness of the United States to work substantively on individual arms control and risk reduction measures. At the same time, it was recorded that Washington has finally recognized the justification of a number of Russian proposals and initiatives in these areas that have been put forward in recent years.
At the same time, we once again draw the attention of the American side to the fact that Russia, in the documents we submitted on security guarantees, proposed to follow the path of a comprehensive long-term settlement of the unacceptable situation that continues to develop in the Euro-Atlantic area. First of all, we are talking about creating a stable foundation for a security architecture in the form of an agreement on NATO refusing to take further actions that harm Russia's security. This remains a constant imperative for us. In the absence of such a strong foundation, interrelated arms control and military risk reduction measures that ensure restraint and predictability of military activity in separate areas, even if they can be agreed upon, will not be sustainable in the long term.
Thus, the Russian proposals are of a package nature and should be considered as a whole without singling out its individual components.
In this regard, we would like to focus on the lack of a constructive reaction from Washington and Brussels to the most important elements of the Russian initiative that we have clearly identified. As for arms control issues, we consider them exclusively in the general context of a comprehensive, package approach to resolving the problem of security guarantees.
"Post START" and the "security equation"
The United States proposes "immediately" to engage in the development of "measures in the development of START" within the framework of the dialogue on strategic stability. However, at the same time, the American side is trying to fix an approach that has not been coordinated with us, which provides for focusing exclusively on nuclear weapons, regardless of the ability of certain weapons to pose a direct threat to the national territory of the other side. Such a one-sided view of things is contrary to the understandings reached at the Russian-American summit on June 16, 2021 in Geneva regarding the comprehensive nature of the strategic dialogue, designed to lay the foundation for future arms control and risk reduction measures.
Russia continues to advocate an integrated approach to strategic issues. We propose to engage in the joint development of a new "safety equation".
A set of elements of the concept we propose, which remains fully relevant, was brought to the attention of the American side - incl. during the meetings within the framework of the strategic dialogue and in the working document submitted by us on December 17, 2021 on its completion.
We did not see in the US response confirmation that the American side is fully committed to observing the immutable principle of the indivisibility of security. General statements about the consideration by the American side of this postulate directly contradict Washington's unwillingness to abandon its counterproductive and destabilizing course of creating advantages for itself and its allies at the expense of Russia's security interests. This is exactly what is happening as a result of the unrestrained implementation by the North Atlantic Alliance, with the leading role of the United States, of a policy of unrestricted geostrategic and military development of the post-Soviet space, including the territory of Ukraine, which is of a particularly sensitive nature for us. All this is happening directly on Russian borders. Thus, our "red lines" and fundamental security interests are ignored and Russia's inalienable right to provide for them is denied. For us, this is, of course, unacceptable.
Additionally, we remind you that this principle is enshrined in the preamble to the 2011 Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms, which the parties agreed to extend for five years without any exceptions in February last year, as well as in a number of high-level OSCE and Russia-NATO basic documents adopted: in the preamble of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe, the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act, the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Charter for European Security, the Rome Declaration Russia-NATO 2002 and the Astana Declaration of the 2010 OSCE Summit.
We note that the response received mentions Washington's adherence to the concept of the indivisibility of security. But in the text it boils down to the right of states "to freely choose or change the methods of ensuring their security, including union treaties." This freedom is not absolute and is only half of the well-known formula fixed in the Charter for European Security. Its second part requires, when exercising this right, not "... to strengthen one's security at the expense of the security of other states." We cannot regard the letter received from NATO dated February 10, 2022 as a response to the message sent by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on January 28, 2022 to US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on this issue. We asked for a response in a national capacity.
NATO Open Door Policy
The US reaffirms "strong support" for NATO's "open door" policy. But it contradicts the basic commitments adopted within the framework of the CSCE/OSCE, above all the commitment "not to strengthen one's security at the expense of the security of others." This policy is not consistent with the guidelines of the alliance itself, which, following the meeting of the NATO Foreign Minister on June 6-7, 1991 in Copenhagen, undertook "not to take unilateral advantages from the changed situation in Europe", "not to threaten the legitimate interests" of other states, not to strive for them " isolation" or "drawing new dividing lines on the continent".
We call on the United States and NATO to return to fulfilling their international obligations in the field of maintaining peace and security. We expect concrete proposals from the members of the alliance on the content and forms of legal consolidation of the renunciation of NATO's further eastward expansion.
Batch nature of offers
We note the readiness of the United States to work substantively on individual arms control and risk reduction measures. At the same time, it was recorded that Washington has finally recognized the justification of a number of Russian proposals and initiatives in these areas that have been put forward in recent years.
At the same time, we once again draw the attention of the American side to the fact that Russia, in the documents we submitted on security guarantees, proposed to follow the path of a comprehensive long-term settlement of the unacceptable situation that continues to develop in the Euro-Atlantic area. First of all, we are talking about creating a stable foundation for a security architecture in the form of an agreement on NATO refusing to take further actions that harm Russia's security. This remains a constant imperative for us. In the absence of such a strong foundation, interrelated arms control and military risk reduction measures that ensure restraint and predictability of military activity in separate areas, even if they can be agreed upon, will not be sustainable in the long term.
Thus, the Russian proposals are of a package nature and should be considered as a whole without singling out its individual components.
In this regard, we would like to focus on the lack of a constructive reaction from Washington and Brussels to the most important elements of the Russian initiative that we have clearly identified. As for arms control issues, we consider them exclusively in the general context of a comprehensive, package approach to resolving the problem of security guarantees.
"Post START" and the "security equation"
The United States proposes "immediately" to engage in the development of "measures in the development of START" within the framework of the dialogue on strategic stability. However, at the same time, the American side is trying to fix an approach that has not been coordinated with us, which provides for focusing exclusively on nuclear weapons, regardless of the ability of certain weapons to pose a direct threat to the national territory of the other side. Such a one-sided view of things is contrary to the understandings reached at the Russian-American summit on June 16, 2021 in Geneva regarding the comprehensive nature of the strategic dialogue, designed to lay the foundation for future arms control and risk reduction measures.
Russia continues to advocate an integrated approach to strategic issues. We propose to engage in the joint development of a new "safety equation".
A set of elements of the concept we propose, which remains fully relevant, was brought to the attention of the American side - incl. during the meetings within the framework of the strategic dialogue and in the working document submitted by us on December 17, 2021 on its completion.
Crumpetlicker
Well-Known Member
The conversation for me was about workers in general. Wood for the trees old mate. Not everything is about you and MAGA.
printer
Well-Known Member
Deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territory
In its document, the United States did not react to such an element of the "package" of measures proposed by us as the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed outside its borders to the national territory and the refusal of their further deployment outside the national territory, and limited itself to mentioning the need to deal with the problem on the platform of strategic dialogue. non-strategic nuclear weapons without taking into account the peculiarities of their deployment and other factors affecting the security of the parties.
We would like to clarify that our proposals are about solving the problem of the presence on the territory of some non-nuclear NATO states, in violation of the NPT, of US nuclear weapons capable of hitting targets on Russian territory. This would include the elimination of the infrastructure for the rapid deployment of such weapons in Europe, as well as the termination of the NATO practice of training and exercises in the handling of these weapons, which involve non-nuclear NATO member states. Without removing this irritant, discussion of the topic of non-strategic nuclear weapons is impossible.
Ground-based intermediate and shorter range missiles
We regard this issue as one of the priority areas of the Russian-American dialogue on strategic stability. We believe that this category of weapons is a necessary component of the new "security equation" that should be worked out jointly by Russia and the United States.
We continue to proceed from the relevance of Russian initiatives in the field of "post-INF Treaty", which are based on the idea of reciprocal verifiable moratoriums on the deployment of ground-based INF Treaty in Europe.
In principle, we are open to substantive consideration of the ways of its practical implementation. At the same time, we note the continuing uncertainty in Washington’s approaches to the main parameters of potential control measures over these weapons, primarily to their coverage, which should cover all weapons of the appropriate range in nuclear and non-nuclear equipment.
It was noted that the United States is taking the Russian approach as a basis, which provides for the mutual settlement of mutual concerns in the context of the previously existing INF Treaty. The version of the development of our idea of mutual verification measures proposed by the American side in relation to the Aegis Ashore complexes in Romania and Poland, as well as some objects in the European part of Russia, can be further taken
As emphasized in a statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin dated October 26, 2020, and subsequently brought to the attention of the United States on numerous occasions, potential transparency measures for Russian facilities subject to agreement could include monitoring the absence of the Russian 9M729 missile there. We remind you that this step is a manifestation of goodwill, given that the characteristics of the 9M729 missile do not contradict the requirements of the former INF Treaty in any way and that the United States has not provided any evidence that would confirm the accusations against Russia. At the same time, the American side ignored the voluntary event organized by us during the period of this Treaty on January 23, 2019 to demonstrate the device and technical characteristics of the 9M729 missile and its launcher.
Heavy bombers and surface warships
We note the attention of the American side to the Russian idea of additional risk mitigation measures in relation to flights of heavy bombers near the national borders of the parties. We see a subject for discussion and the potential for mutually acceptable agreements.
We remind you of an equally important element of our "package" proposal concerning similar cruises of combat surface ships, which also involve serious risks.
Military exercises and maneuvers
The United States did not respond to the proposals contained in sec. 2 tbsp. 4 Russian draft treaty. The American side, apparently, proceeds from the fact that it is possible to reduce tension in the military sphere by increasing transparency and additional measures to reduce the danger in line with the proposals of the West to modernize the Vienna Document.
We consider such an approach unrealistic and one-sided, aimed at "seeing through" the activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Confidence- and security-building measures under the Vienna Document 2011 are adequate to the current situation. To start discussing the possibility of updating them, the necessary conditions must be created. And for this, the United States and its allies should abandon the policy of "containment" of Russia and take concrete practical measures to de-escalate the military-political situation, including in line with para. 2 tbsp. 4 of our draft agreement.
As regards the prevention of incidents on the high seas and in the airspace above it, we welcome the readiness of the United States for appropriate consultations. However, this work cannot replace the settlement of the key problems posed by Russia.
February 17, 2022
tass-ru.translate.goog
In its document, the United States did not react to such an element of the "package" of measures proposed by us as the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed outside its borders to the national territory and the refusal of their further deployment outside the national territory, and limited itself to mentioning the need to deal with the problem on the platform of strategic dialogue. non-strategic nuclear weapons without taking into account the peculiarities of their deployment and other factors affecting the security of the parties.
We would like to clarify that our proposals are about solving the problem of the presence on the territory of some non-nuclear NATO states, in violation of the NPT, of US nuclear weapons capable of hitting targets on Russian territory. This would include the elimination of the infrastructure for the rapid deployment of such weapons in Europe, as well as the termination of the NATO practice of training and exercises in the handling of these weapons, which involve non-nuclear NATO member states. Without removing this irritant, discussion of the topic of non-strategic nuclear weapons is impossible.
Ground-based intermediate and shorter range missiles
We regard this issue as one of the priority areas of the Russian-American dialogue on strategic stability. We believe that this category of weapons is a necessary component of the new "security equation" that should be worked out jointly by Russia and the United States.
We continue to proceed from the relevance of Russian initiatives in the field of "post-INF Treaty", which are based on the idea of reciprocal verifiable moratoriums on the deployment of ground-based INF Treaty in Europe.
In principle, we are open to substantive consideration of the ways of its practical implementation. At the same time, we note the continuing uncertainty in Washington’s approaches to the main parameters of potential control measures over these weapons, primarily to their coverage, which should cover all weapons of the appropriate range in nuclear and non-nuclear equipment.
It was noted that the United States is taking the Russian approach as a basis, which provides for the mutual settlement of mutual concerns in the context of the previously existing INF Treaty. The version of the development of our idea of mutual verification measures proposed by the American side in relation to the Aegis Ashore complexes in Romania and Poland, as well as some objects in the European part of Russia, can be further taken
As emphasized in a statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin dated October 26, 2020, and subsequently brought to the attention of the United States on numerous occasions, potential transparency measures for Russian facilities subject to agreement could include monitoring the absence of the Russian 9M729 missile there. We remind you that this step is a manifestation of goodwill, given that the characteristics of the 9M729 missile do not contradict the requirements of the former INF Treaty in any way and that the United States has not provided any evidence that would confirm the accusations against Russia. At the same time, the American side ignored the voluntary event organized by us during the period of this Treaty on January 23, 2019 to demonstrate the device and technical characteristics of the 9M729 missile and its launcher.
Heavy bombers and surface warships
We note the attention of the American side to the Russian idea of additional risk mitigation measures in relation to flights of heavy bombers near the national borders of the parties. We see a subject for discussion and the potential for mutually acceptable agreements.
We remind you of an equally important element of our "package" proposal concerning similar cruises of combat surface ships, which also involve serious risks.
Military exercises and maneuvers
The United States did not respond to the proposals contained in sec. 2 tbsp. 4 Russian draft treaty. The American side, apparently, proceeds from the fact that it is possible to reduce tension in the military sphere by increasing transparency and additional measures to reduce the danger in line with the proposals of the West to modernize the Vienna Document.
We consider such an approach unrealistic and one-sided, aimed at "seeing through" the activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Confidence- and security-building measures under the Vienna Document 2011 are adequate to the current situation. To start discussing the possibility of updating them, the necessary conditions must be created. And for this, the United States and its allies should abandon the policy of "containment" of Russia and take concrete practical measures to de-escalate the military-political situation, including in line with para. 2 tbsp. 4 of our draft agreement.
As regards the prevention of incidents on the high seas and in the airspace above it, we welcome the readiness of the United States for appropriate consultations. However, this work cannot replace the settlement of the key problems posed by Russia.
February 17, 2022
Реакция России на ответ США по гарантиям безопасности. Полный текст - ТАСС
События в России и мире. Аналитические публикации. Материалы пресс-конференций. Видео- и фоторепортажи
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printer
Well-Known Member
Ukraine has not forgotten Crimea.
hanimmal
Well-Known Member
You don't make sense.
But I guess you are going a little off script. I guess that is why you had to toss in a MAGA. But I guess with the programming, as soon as someone says brainwashing and trolls at the same time, it is likely just a natural link being made.
Fogdog
Well-Known Member
lulz
It was a loaded question based upon a ridiculous hypothetical situation. In other words propaganda.
What does Mexico's relationship with the US have in common with Kazakhstan's relationship with Russia? I'm curious what you say about that. Do try to stay in current times.
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BudmanTX
Well-Known Member
yeah you need to do some too...btw...
this is why they objected
Since 2018, Hungary has been blocking ministerial-level political meetings between NATO and Ukraine as a sign of protest over Ukraine violating the human rights of its ethnic minorities.
when that was cleaned up, everything was gonna go as planned
captainmorgan
Well-Known Member
It's really weird that twitter is the best source for new info on a war.
captainmorgan
Well-Known Member
printer
Well-Known Member
Why care about Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum
Since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, the United States has provided Ukraine with $3 billion in reform and military assistance and $3 billion in loan guarantees. U.S. troops in western Ukraine train their Ukrainian colleagues. Washington, in concert with the European Union, has taken steps to isolate Moscow politically and imposed a series of economic and visa sanctions on Russia and Russians.
The furor over President Donald Trump’s sordid bid to extort the president of Ukraine into investigating his potential 2020 political opponent raises an obvious question: Why should the United States care so much about Ukraine, a country 5,000 miles away? A big part of the reason is that U.S. officials told the Ukrainians the United States would care when negotiating the Budapest Memorandum on security assurances, signed 25 years ago this week.
A nuclear-armed state breaks up
In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States, Russia, and Britain committed “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force” against the country. Those assurances played a key role in persuading the Ukrainian government in Kyiv to give up what amounted to the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, consisting of some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads.
When the USSR broke up in late 1991, there were nuclear weapons scattered in the resulting post-Soviet states. The George H. W. Bush administration attached highest priority to ensuring this would not lead to an increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. Moreover, as it watched Yugoslavia break apart violently, the Bush administration worried that the Soviet collapse might also turn violent, raising the prospect of conflict among nuclear-armed states. Ensuring no increase in the number of nuclear weapons states meant that, in practice, only Russia would retain nuclear arms. The Clinton administration pursued the same goal. With the prospect of extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely looming, an alternative course that allowed other post-Soviet states to keep nuclear weapons would have set a bad precedent.
Eliminating the strategic nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and strategic bombers in Ukraine was a big deal for Washington. The ICBMs and bombers carried warheads of monstrous size — all designed, built, and deployed to attack America. The warheads atop the SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine had explosive yields of 400-550 kilotons each — that is, 27 to 37 times the size of the atomic bomb that devastated Hiroshima. The 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads — more than six times the number of nuclear warheads that China currently possesses — could have destroyed every U.S. city with a population of more than 50,000 three times over, with warheads left to spare.
Assurances for Ukraine
Before agreeing to give up this nuclear arsenal, Kyiv sought three assurances. First, it wanted compensation for the value of the highly-enriched uranium in the nuclear warheads, which could be blended down for use as fuel for nuclear reactors. Russia agreed to provide that.
Second, eliminating ICBMs, ICBM silos, and bombers did not come cheaply. With its economy rapidly contracting, the Ukrainian government could not afford the costs. The United States agreed to cover those costs with Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance.
Third, Ukraine wanted guarantees or assurances of its security once it got rid of the nuclear arms. The Budapest Memorandum provided security assurances.
Unfortunately, Russia has broken virtually all the commitments it undertook in that document. It used military force to seize, and then illegally annex, Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in early 2014. Russian and Russian proxy forces have waged war for more than five years in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas, claiming more than 13,000 lives and driving some two million people from their homes.
Some have argued that, since the United States did not invade Ukraine, it abided by its Budapest Memorandum commitments. True, in a narrow sense. However, when negotiating the security assurances, U.S. officials told their Ukrainian counterparts that, were Russia to violate them, the United States would take a strong interest and respond.
Washington did not promise unlimited support. The Budapest Memorandum contains security “assurances,” not “guarantees.” Guarantees would have implied a commitment of American military force, which NATO members have. U.S. officials made clear that was not on offer. Hence, assurances.
Beyond that, U.S. and Ukrainian officials did not discuss in detail how Washington might respond in the event of a Russian violation. That owed in part to then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin. He had his flaws, but he insisted that there be no revision of the boundaries separating the states that emerged from the Soviet collapse. Yeltsin respected Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity. Vladimir Putin does not.
U.S. officials did assure their Ukrainian counterparts, however, that there would be a response. The United States should continue to provide reform and military assistance to Ukraine. It should continue sanctions on Russia. It should continue to demand that Moscow end its aggression against Ukraine. And it should continue to urge its European partners to assist Kyiv and keep the sanctions pressure on the Kremlin.
Washington should do this, because it said it would act if Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum. That was part of the price it paid in return for a drastic reduction in the nuclear threat to America. The United States should keep its word.
www.brookings.edu
Since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, the United States has provided Ukraine with $3 billion in reform and military assistance and $3 billion in loan guarantees. U.S. troops in western Ukraine train their Ukrainian colleagues. Washington, in concert with the European Union, has taken steps to isolate Moscow politically and imposed a series of economic and visa sanctions on Russia and Russians.
The furor over President Donald Trump’s sordid bid to extort the president of Ukraine into investigating his potential 2020 political opponent raises an obvious question: Why should the United States care so much about Ukraine, a country 5,000 miles away? A big part of the reason is that U.S. officials told the Ukrainians the United States would care when negotiating the Budapest Memorandum on security assurances, signed 25 years ago this week.
A nuclear-armed state breaks up
In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States, Russia, and Britain committed “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force” against the country. Those assurances played a key role in persuading the Ukrainian government in Kyiv to give up what amounted to the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, consisting of some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads.
When the USSR broke up in late 1991, there were nuclear weapons scattered in the resulting post-Soviet states. The George H. W. Bush administration attached highest priority to ensuring this would not lead to an increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. Moreover, as it watched Yugoslavia break apart violently, the Bush administration worried that the Soviet collapse might also turn violent, raising the prospect of conflict among nuclear-armed states. Ensuring no increase in the number of nuclear weapons states meant that, in practice, only Russia would retain nuclear arms. The Clinton administration pursued the same goal. With the prospect of extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely looming, an alternative course that allowed other post-Soviet states to keep nuclear weapons would have set a bad precedent.
Eliminating the strategic nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and strategic bombers in Ukraine was a big deal for Washington. The ICBMs and bombers carried warheads of monstrous size — all designed, built, and deployed to attack America. The warheads atop the SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine had explosive yields of 400-550 kilotons each — that is, 27 to 37 times the size of the atomic bomb that devastated Hiroshima. The 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads — more than six times the number of nuclear warheads that China currently possesses — could have destroyed every U.S. city with a population of more than 50,000 three times over, with warheads left to spare.
Assurances for Ukraine
Before agreeing to give up this nuclear arsenal, Kyiv sought three assurances. First, it wanted compensation for the value of the highly-enriched uranium in the nuclear warheads, which could be blended down for use as fuel for nuclear reactors. Russia agreed to provide that.
Second, eliminating ICBMs, ICBM silos, and bombers did not come cheaply. With its economy rapidly contracting, the Ukrainian government could not afford the costs. The United States agreed to cover those costs with Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance.
Third, Ukraine wanted guarantees or assurances of its security once it got rid of the nuclear arms. The Budapest Memorandum provided security assurances.
Unfortunately, Russia has broken virtually all the commitments it undertook in that document. It used military force to seize, and then illegally annex, Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in early 2014. Russian and Russian proxy forces have waged war for more than five years in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas, claiming more than 13,000 lives and driving some two million people from their homes.
Some have argued that, since the United States did not invade Ukraine, it abided by its Budapest Memorandum commitments. True, in a narrow sense. However, when negotiating the security assurances, U.S. officials told their Ukrainian counterparts that, were Russia to violate them, the United States would take a strong interest and respond.
Washington did not promise unlimited support. The Budapest Memorandum contains security “assurances,” not “guarantees.” Guarantees would have implied a commitment of American military force, which NATO members have. U.S. officials made clear that was not on offer. Hence, assurances.
Beyond that, U.S. and Ukrainian officials did not discuss in detail how Washington might respond in the event of a Russian violation. That owed in part to then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin. He had his flaws, but he insisted that there be no revision of the boundaries separating the states that emerged from the Soviet collapse. Yeltsin respected Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity. Vladimir Putin does not.
U.S. officials did assure their Ukrainian counterparts, however, that there would be a response. The United States should continue to provide reform and military assistance to Ukraine. It should continue sanctions on Russia. It should continue to demand that Moscow end its aggression against Ukraine. And it should continue to urge its European partners to assist Kyiv and keep the sanctions pressure on the Kremlin.
Washington should do this, because it said it would act if Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum. That was part of the price it paid in return for a drastic reduction in the nuclear threat to America. The United States should keep its word.
Why care about Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum | Brookings
The furor over President Donald Trump’s sordid bid to extort the president of Ukraine into investigating his potential 2020 political opponent raises an obvious question: Why should the United States care so much about Ukraine, a country 5,000 miles away?
captainmorgan
Well-Known Member
If Stinky was still in office he would be cheering on the shirtless midget and repeating all the russian propaganda.
hanimmal
Well-Known Member
While undermining NATO's response and burying intel so that he could gaslight Americans.